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A MILITARY MESS: CERCLA LIABILITY AND THE
BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT
DANIEL C. STEPPICK
I. INTRODUCTION
A SIGNIFICANTLY DIMINISHED Communist threat
and America' s corresponding emergence from the
Cold War have prompted the most substantial defense
force reduction since the post-World War II period.'
With the chance of armed conflict reduced, the Pentagon
is scrambling to decrease the size of its forces in conform-
ance with significant military budget cuts. 2 The fall of the
Berlin Wall has prompted the diminution of the American
arsenal and the rise of a substantially leaner peace-time
military. The Pentagon already plans to reduce personnel
requirements and slash procurement schedules. A
smaller stockpile of military hardware and diminished
personnel requirements mean that domestic military ba-
ses, which were once integral parts of national security,
will become expensive government ghost towns. Conse-
quently, the government must dispose of unessential mili-
tary facilities. A major component of this military down-
sizing effort is the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Act of 1990 (the Act).4
The Act prescribes the closing and realignment of a
L.R. Jones, The Pentagon Squeeze: The Changing Global Picture and Budget Cuts are
Forcing Radical Changes at the Defense Department, Gov'T EXECUrIVE, Feb. 1992, at 47.
2 Id.
3Id.
4 Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1808 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (Supp. III
1991)).
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substantial number of domestic military bases as part of
the planned downsizing of overall military forces. 5 In or-
der to recover closing costs and rebuild wounded local
economies, however, the federal government must sell or
transfer real property at each base site to the public sec-
tor.6 The ability of the federal government to transfer
base property to municipal and private control is severely
impaired by thousands of environmental hazards left be-
hind by military operations.7 Environmental cleanup at
these sites may delay cost recovery and redevelopment for
decades .8
This Comment first explores the purpose of the De-
fense Base Closure and Realignment Act and the nature
of the environmental hazards left behind by the military at
domestic bases. 9 Next, it reviews the framework of liabil-
ity under the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)' 0 and
the danger of passing that liability to purchasers of base
land." After establishing this background, the Comment
then examines several ways in which municipalities and
private entities that take title to base land may protect
themselves from CERCLA liability. These protections in-
clude the innocent landowner defense,' 2 the govern-
ment's limited waiver of immunity to suit under
CERCLA,' 3 the notice requirement for sale of govern-
ment land,' 4 statutorily mandated deed covenants,' 5 con-
tractual indemnity for environmental liability,' 6 and
5Id.
6 See infra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
7 Keith Schneider, Toxic Pollution Stalls Transfer of Military Sites, N.Y. TIMEs, June
29, 1991, at 3A.
8 Marilyn Odendahl, Will Jefferson Proving Ground Really Close?, IND. Bus, MAG.,
Feb. 1991, at 33.
9 See infra notes 19-75 and accompanying text.
l0 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
1 See infra notes 76-110 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 152-84 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 185-98 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 202-18 and accompanying text.
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several recent efforts by legislators to indemnify purchas-
ers and expedite sale of military sites. 7 Finally, this Com-
ment looks at some of the potential long-run benefits that
local communities and the defense industry as a whole
may derive from base closures and related environmental
cleanup. 18
A. THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT
The stated purpose of the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act "is to provide a fair process that will re-
sult in the timely closure and realignment of military in-
stallations inside the United States." 9 President Bush
appointed the Commission on Base Realignment and Clo-
sure (the Commission), with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to conduct studies that would identify those do-
mestic military bases that should be closed or realigned
for other use. ° Congress designed the Act to overcome
three problems that had plagued other base closing ef-
forts.2 ' First, the Act imposes a series of inflexible dead-
lines in order to give the process a degree of finality and
to prevent protracted legal challenges from delaying clo-
sures.2 2  Second, the Act removes base closure recom-
mendations from the political arena and makes them the
responsibility of a nonpartisan commission. Finally, the
Act attempts to minimize the opportunity for Congress to
'7 See infra notes 219-58 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 259-70 and accompanying text.
19 Defense Base Closure Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510,
§ 2901(b), 104 Stat. 1808 (1990).
20 National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. United States, 905 F.2d 400, 402 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (holding that challenges to discretionary decisions under the Base Clo-
sure an Realignment Act are nonjusticiable). The Commission applied the follow-
ing criteria in making its base selections: (1) current operational readiness; (2)
availability and condition of land and facilities at both existing and potential re-
ceiving locations; (3) force requirements at receiving locations; (4) cost and man-
power implications; (5) extent and timing of potential cost savings; (6) economic
impact on the base area community; (7) community support at the receiving loca-
tions; (8) environmental impact; and (9) the implementation process involved. Id.
21 Specter v. Garrett, 971 F.2d 936, 958 (3d Cir. 1992) (Alito, J. concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 959.
19931 451
452 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [59
taint the closure selections with self-interested deals.
This is accomplished by forcing Congress to deal with the
closure package as a whole, without the opportunity to
amend base selections.24 Thus, the Base Closure and Re-
alignment Act provides an efficient vehicle for streamlin-
ing the nation's military infrastructure.
In April 1991, the Secretary of Defense recommended
the closure of fourteen domestic Air Force bases.25 The
Commission recommended the removal of one of the ba-
ses from the list. Then it made recommendations to Pres-
ident Bush, which included closing forty-seven domestic
military bases and realigning twenty-eight bases for other
use.26 The President approved the commission's recom-
mendations on July 10, 1991.27 Congress held hearings
on the commission's recommendations pursuant to a pro-
vision in the Act that gives Congress an opportunity to
disapprove of the Commission's recommendations in
their entirety.28 The House then rejected a motion to dis-
approve the recommendations. 29 The Secretary of De-
fense, therefore, has two years from the date of the
President's approval to begin all recommended closures
and realignments.3 0 All closure and realignment actions
must be completed within six years.3 '
The latest round of base closures is currently in the
works. In March 1993, the newest base closure commis-
sion received the Pentagon's list of military installations
to be closed. 2 The commission made additions to the list
24 Id. at 960.
25 Cohen v. Rice, 800 F. Supp. 1006, 1007-08 (D. Me. 1992) (holding that rec-
ommendation by Base Closure and Realignment Commission was not a final
agency decision and therefore not subject to judicial review).
26 Jones, supra note 1, at 47.
27 Cohen, 800 F. Supp. at 1008; 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 930 (July 15,
1991).
28 Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2904(b), 104 Stat. 1813 (1990).
29 137 CONG. REC. H6006-40 (daily ed. July 30, 1991). The House rejected
Joint Resolution 308, which would have disapproved the base closure recommen-
dations entirely. Id. at H6040.
so Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2904(b), 104 Stat. 1813 (1990).
31 Id.
12 Bruce W. Nelan, Ready, Aim, Shut Down, TIME, June 28, 1993, at 36.
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and sent it to President Clinton.33 The President en-
dorsed the commission's list in July 1993.34 Since Con-
gress failed to pass resolutions rejecting the entire list
within 45 days, the list became law."
B. THE NEED FOR ACTION
Two factors make it imperative that the federal govern-
ment execute its closure plan and transfer base sites to
local communities or private entities as soon as possible.
First, many of the communities that surround domestic
bases have, for decades, depended on the bases and their
personnel to support local tax bases and patronize area
merchants.3 6 Redevelopment of base property will, in
some cases, be essential to the revitalization of suffering
local economies.3 7 Second, in closing military bases, Con-
gress intends to save government dollars. The govern-
ment will be unable to fully realize cost savings from base
closures until base land can be sold to private developers
or local governments.3 8
1. Effect on Local Economies
As might be expected, the closure of domestic military
bases will create great economic hardships for the com-
munities surrounding each base. 39 Many communities
have been shaped by the expansion of American military
infrastructure. Those communities, which have for de-
cades existed symbiotically with military installations, are
ss Id.
54 James Bornmeir, Last Ditch Bid to Halt Base Closings Rejected by Senate, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1993, at A3.
- Id. California Senator Dianne Feinstein sponsored Senate Resolution 114 to
disapprove the list. Id. Feinstein cited underestimated environmental cleanup
costs as one of several reasons for rejecting the commission's list. 139 CONG. REc.
S 11,965 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1993) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). The Senate nev-
ertheless rejected the resolution by a vote of 83-12. Id. at S12,003-04.
-6 138 CONG. REC. H7862-63 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Swift).
37 138 CONG. REC. S16,687 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
.1 Jones, supra note 1, at 48.
s, 138 CONG. REC. H7863 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1992) (statement of Rep. Swift).
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now facing the possibility of increased local unemploy-
ment, failed businesses, and deflated tax bases.4 ° In many
cases, the economic opportunities realized when former
military installations are made available for other use may
soften economic devastation. Once military activity at
these sites has ceased, the local communities can establish
recreational, industrial, and residential areas. 4' Such al-
ternative uses will generate revenue and jobs that can
counteract the effect that the loss of a military base has on
the local economy.42 Only through "timely disposition"
of former military sites and facilities can local economies
experience full recovery.4
Once transfer of base land has been completed, local
governments will be free to redevelop the sites or to use
existing military facilities to fulfill the pressing needs of
the community. Many former domestic Air Force bases
can be converted to commercial airports to satisfy the
constant need for efficient and economical access to air
travel.44 According to the FAA the number of congested
major airports will increase from twenty-one to forty
before 1999.4 5 In spite of enormous growth in commer-
cial air traffic, airport capacity has not been increased to
an adequate level.46 The shrinkage of military forces has
unlocked new solutions to the public airport crunch. The
closure of domestic Air Force bases in compliance with
the Act has opened the door to faster and less expensive
development of public commercial and industrial
40 Id.
4" Donald C. Dilworth, Military Won't Clean up Bases Before Closing Them, TRIAL,
Oct. 1990, at 14; Sacramento Recommends Conversion of Mather Air Force Base, 52
WKLY. Bus. AVIATION, Mar. 4, 1991, at 95.
42 Schneider, supra note 7, at 3A.
I. H.R. Doc. No. 111, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1991).
44 Lyn L. Creswell, Airport Policy in the United States: The Need for Accountability,
Planning, and Leadership, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 45-49 (1990).
41 FAA Still Considering Joint Use, Military Base Conversion, AIRPORTS, Nov. 21,
1989, at 547.
- George W. Hamlin, Boosting Operations at Underused Airports Can Ease Congestion




Austin, Texas is one example of a base community that
is trying to take full advantage of the loss of a military
base. Austin plans to convert Bergstrom Air Force Base
into a public airport.48 The city was considering other
sites for a new airport when the Base Closure and Re-
alignment Commission included Bergstrom on its closure
list, making a better option available to the city. 49 The Air
Force has indicated that it will give seventy-five percent of
the base land back to the City of Austin under the terms of
an express trust, which guaranteed the return of the land
to the city after the termination of military activity.5 °
Plans are also pending for conversion of George Air Force
Base in Adelanto, California, to a commercial airport.5'
2. Closure Cost Recovery
Perhaps the best reason for the federal government to
expedite transfer of military sites to the public sector is
the need to generate revenue and recover some of the
costs of base closure. The cost of implementing base clo-
sures is estimated at $5.7 billion for 1992 through 1997.52
Savings from base closures and realignments are esti-
mated at $6.5 billion.53 The military could greatly in-
crease total financial benefits by selling off former base
land that is worth an estimated $1.9 billion.54
II. EXTENT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM
Conversion of former military bases will involve re-
41 Creswell, supra note 44, at 45. Additionally, the FAA has begun to make un-
used military airspace available to commercial traffic. Id.
48 57 Fed. Reg. 28,709 (1992).
4, Austin, Texas, City Council Endorses Bergstrom AFB SiteforAirport, AVIATION DAILY,
Aug. 7, 1991, at 247.
KPMG Peat Marwick to Plan Conversion at Bergstrom AFB for Austin, Texas, AIR-
PORTS, Dec. 17, 1991, at 517.
51 George AFB Conversion Proposal Emphasizes Business Use, AVIATION DAILY, May 6,
1992, at 223.
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moval of toxic hazards, including asbestos-containing
buildings, underground fuel storage tanks, unexploded
ordnance, hazardous chemicals, contaminated water ta-
bles, and, in some cases, radioactive hazards. 55 Contami-
nation at the Navy's Hunters Point Shipyard includes soil
and groundwater polluted with fuel, PCBs, heavy metals,
asbestos, and battery acid.5 6 Such environmental contam-
ination is the product of decades of both military neces-
sity5 7 and neglect during the Cold War.58 "[I]nstallations
that had unique military missions may manifest environ-
mental problems that, while tolerable when balanced
against the paramount necessities of maintaining national
security, are impossible to reconcile with traditional pri-
vate and commercial uses. ''59 Military bases are in some
cases the site for some of the most severe environmental
contamination in the nation. The National Priorities List
(NPL) contains the EPA's hit list of the most dangerous
waste sites in the country.60 Of the 116 federal facilities
included on the list, ninety-five are military installations. 6'
Nine of the bases slated for closure are included on the
NPL.62  Four of these sites relate to military aviation -
.55 Intelligence, New Hampshire, AIRPORTS, Oct. 24, 1989, at 297.
56 Dan Fost, Toxic Waste Dispute Stalls Plan for Base, CHI. TRIB.,July 21, 1991, at
15.
51 Dilworth, supra note 41, at 15.
58 Schneider, supra note 7, at 3A.
59 Major William D. Turkula, Determining Cleanup Standards for Hazardous Waste
Sites, 135 MIL. L. REV. 167, 167 (1992).
60 Anne D. Weber, Misery Loves Company: Spreading the Costs of CERCLA Cleanup,
42 VAND. L. REV. 1469, 1473 n.25 (1989). The Superfund National Priorities List
(NPL) was established for cleanup of the nation's worst environmental hazards.
Id. The EPA includes sites on the NPL when it determines that the sites "substan-
tially endanger public health and welfare." Id. Only NPL sites may receive
Superfund cleanup financing. The EPA mandates that before an NPL site may be
sold or transferred, cleanup operations must be complete. Id.
61 Paul Hoversten, Some Military Bases Will Never Be Cleaned Up, USA TODAY, July
5, 1991, at 7A.
62 Fost, supra note 56, at 15. Superfund sites scheduled for closure include:
Williams Air Force Base, Chandler, Arizona; Castle Air Force Base, Merced, Cali-
fornia; Fort Ord, Seaside, California; Moffett Naval Air Station, Sunnyvale, Cali-
fornia; Sacramento Army Depot, Sacramento, California; Treasure Island Naval
Station/Hunters Point Annex, San Francisco, California; Loring Air Force Base,
Limestone, Maine; Fort Devens, Ayer, Massachusetts; and Davisville Naval Con-
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either Air Force or Naval Air Bases. 63 Other closing ba-
ses, including Carswell Air Force Base in Fort Worth,
Texas, may be added to the NPL when EPA inspections
are complete.64 Whether or not a base is currently in-
cluded on the NPL, environmental hazards and corre-
sponding response costs may still arise.
The base closure commission used a six-year pay-back
curve in selecting bases for closure.65 Savings from a base
closure were to equal costs of closure within six years.66
Unfortunately, the commission did not allow for environ-
mental cleanup costs in its original cost estimates because
technically, the government must clean up environmental
hazards, whether or not the base closes. 67 Pressure from
the federal government and from the private sector to
transfer title to base property compels the government to
expedite cleanup operations and triggers the need for im-
mediate environmental cleanup. 68 As a result of the omis-
sion of environmental cleanup expenses, the
Commission's six-year payback estimates may be severely
flawed. If so, much of the estimated savings from closing
these bases may be lost due to the excessive cost of envi-
ronmental cleanup. 69
struction Battalion Center, North Kingston, Rhode Island. Hoversten, supra note
61, at 7A.
63 Hoversten, supra note 61, at 7A. Contaminated air bases on the NPL include:
Williams AFB (contaminated with heavy metals in soil, fuels and lubricants in
ground water); Castle AFB (contaminated with nitrates and pesticides in water
tables beneath and near base); Loring AFB (contaminated with solvents and other
toxins that threaten water supply); and Moffett NAS (contaminated with metal
wastes, PCBs, and solvents threatening water supplies and wetlands). Id. The
Navy will retain responsibility for the environmental cleanup at Moffett NAS,
which is estimated at $154 million over a 15 year period. Breck W. Henderson,
NASA Plans to Take Over Moffett When Naval Base Closes in 1994, AViATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Apr. 27, 1992, at 56.
- Thomas Korosec, Carswell Base May Join Worst Toxic Sites List, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, May 23, 1992, at Al.




-) For example, the cost of cleaning up unexploded ordnance at the army's Jef-
ferson Proving Ground may have been greatly underestimated. The commission
estimated that closure costs would be recovered in six years. It may be impossi-
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The Department of Defense (DOD) is authorized to de-
posit revenue from the sale of real property at domestic
bases in a special closure account. 70 Half of this fund may
be used for cleanup and closing costs associated with the
sales. 7' Adequate cleanup funds will not be available in
this account, however, until the government is free to sell
land. The Pentagon budget for 1992 included $1.25 bil-
lion for environmental cleanup at all bases, even those un-
affected by the Closure and Realignment Act.72
In addition to a 1992 Superfund budget of $1.75 bil-
lion, President Bush requested an additional $1.3 billion
for DOD environmental cleanup activities. 73 This addi-
tional DOD funding comes directly from the nation's gen-
eral budget. 4 In order to replenish its general fund, the
government is likely to take advantage of CERCLA's
broad liability and enforcement provisions to pursue
other parties for contribution to cleanup costs. 75 The
threat of assuming awesome environmental liability makes
potential developers and local government officials hesi-
tant to take title to military land.
III. CERCLA LIABILITY
Potential liability for environmental contamination at
former military bases is a real and substantial threat.76 If
city governments or private entities accept title to the
ble, however, to meet this goal because the 55,000 acre site, which was used for
test-firing weapons, is littered with 1.4 million "explosive duds." Odendahl, supra
note 8, at 33. When the base closes, unexploded ordnance that can safely be
ignored today will be reclassified as "waste" and require cleanup. Dilworth, supra
note 41, at 14. The General Accounting Office now estimates that it could take 32
years or longer to recover the $50 million required to clean up the base. Id.
70 Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2906, 104 Stat. 1808, 1815-16 (1990).
71 Jones, supra note 1, at 47.
12 Fost, supra note 56, at 15.
7.1 Andrew M. Gaydosh, The Superfund Facility Federal Program: We Have Met the
Enemy and It Is U.S., NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1992, at 21.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Roger N. Boyd, Who Pays for Superfund Cleanups at DOD-Owned Sites?, 2 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1986, at 11. Cleanup costs involving Superfund sites
typically reach several million dollars. id.
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sites, they could be classified as potential responsible par-
ties (PRPs) under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), as amended by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)." This liability
threat discourages the critical redevelopment of former
base sites. 8
A. THE CERCLA SYSTEM
1. Background
Together, CERCLA and SARA form a statutory scheme
for prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites by allowing
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to take direct
removal or remedial action to protect public health and
the environment. 9 Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980
to provide a means for response to the release of hazard-
ous substances.8 0 The statute, as amended by SARA in
1986, provides for action by federal, state, and local gov-
ernments, as well as private parties, to recover response
costs. 8'
Because it was enacted to combat vast contamination
problems throughout the country, CERCLA is given lib-
eral construction.8 2 CERCLA authorizes the EPA to re-
77 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988). For purposes of liability, CERCLA defines a
person as an "individual, firm, corporation .... United States government, State,
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body."
ld.
78 Jennifer Files, Base Closure in NH Offers Hard Lesson, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Feb. 28, 1993, at 8A. Designation of a base as a Superfund site is "a deal-breaker,
and they (companies) flinch and walk away." Id. (quoting Dick Martin, board
member of the National Association of Installation Developers and executive di-
rector of the Castle Air Force Base Redevelopment Authority in Merced,
California).
19 Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Reilly, 927 F.2d 289, 290-91 (6th Cir. 1991). See
generally DAVID SIVE & FRANK FRIEDMAN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW §§ 5.01-.07 (1987) (general treatment of the liability framework of
CERCLA).
80 Barmet, 927 F.2d at 291.
m 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
12 United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding
parent corporation liable as operator).
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cover cleanup costs from PRPs.83 The statute is triggered
by a release or threatened release 84 of a hazardous sub-
stance85 that causes the government or a private entity to
incur response costs.86
2. The Nature of CERCLA Liability
CERCLA may hold PRPs liable for cleanup costs at a
site, despite the fact that the particular PRP never contrib-
uted to the contamination. 7 While CERCLA does not ex-
pressly impose a standard of strict liability, it does state
that the standard of liability under the Act shall be the
same as that imposed by section 311 of the Clean Water
Act. 8 Courts have construed this provision to apply strict
liability to the cleanup of hazardous spills.8 9 CERCLA
does not require imposition of joint and several liability,
83 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). PRPs may be held liable for the following costs:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent
with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, de-
struction, or loss resulting from such a release; and (D) the costs of
any health assessment or health effects study carried out under sec-
tion 9604(i) of this title.
Id. § 9607(a)(4).
81 Id. A release is defined in the statute as "any spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping,
or disposing into the environment" with certain specific exceptions. Id.
§ 9601(22).
85 CERCLA defines a hazardous substance as any material falling into six cate-
gories of substances regulated by certain other environmental statutes. Id.
§ 9601(14).
86 Id. § 9607.
17 David M. Rosenberg, Limiting Lender's Liability for Cleanup Costs, NJ. L.J., Feb.
28, 1991, at 64.
88 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32).
s9 United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988). "We
agree with the overwhelming body of precedent that has interpreted section
107(a) as establishing a strict liability scheme." Id.; see Dedham Water Co. v.
Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing Mon-
santo); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(holding that the legislative history of CERCLA directly supports the application
of strict liability).
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but allows such liability in cases of indivisible injury. 90
CERCLA liability applies to four classes of persons:
present and former owners of facilities, operators of facili-
ties, generators of hazardous substances, and transporters
of those substances. 9' The legislative history of CERCLA
supports the imposition ofjoint and several liability in in-
divisible harm cases. 92 SARA does, however, allow the
court to retain discretion when allocating costs. 93 A PRP
that has been held jointly and severally liable to the gov-
ernment may bring an action for contribution against
other PRPs. In such cases, most courts will consider equi-
table factors in allocating costs between PRPs.94
In order to establish a prima facie case for cleanup cost
recovery under CERCLA, a plaintiff must prove that (1)
the site conforms to the definition of "facility" under sec-
tion 9601(9);95 (2) the defendant is a responsible person
under section 9607(a);96 (3) a release or a threatened re-
9 Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171.
91 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
92 126 CONG. REC. 26,781 (1980). The House passed the Gore Amendment to
the original CERCLA bill, which provided for the consideration of several equita-
ble factors in apportioning costs between PRPs. The equitable considerations in-
cluded: the ability to distinguish the wastes contributed by each party; the amount
and toxicity of the wastes; involvement of each PRP in generation, transportation,
treatment, storage, and disposal of the wastes; the degree of care exercised by
each PRP; and the level of each PRP's cooperation with the government. Id. The
amendment was intended not to require apportionment in all cases, but to give
courts the discretion to apportion liability when equity compelled it. Id. at 26,785.
The Senate, however, did not adopt the Gore Amendment. Id. at 31,965.
93 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3)(A). SARA authorizes the EPA to make a nonbinding
preliminary allocation of responsibility (NBAR) between PRPs. Id.; see also Weber,
supra note 60, at 1480 (recognizing that SARA allows courts to use criteria similar
to that in the Gore Amendment when allocating cleanup costs between parties).
Weber, supra note 60, at 1481.
95 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline
.... well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage
container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or
area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, dis-
posed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not
include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
Id.
Id. § 9607(a)(l)-(4). Responsible persons include:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
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lease has occurred; and (4) the release or threatened re-
lease has caused the plaintiff to incur response costs, 97
which include removal and remedial action, as well as the
EPA's cost of enforcing cleanup activities.98
3. Potential Cost of Liability
Once liability conditions are established, a PRP can be
held liable for all removal and remedial costs incurred by
the federal or state government, as well as costs incurred
by other persons. 99 Additionally, PRPs may face liability
for damage to natural resources and for health studies re-
quired under CERCLA. 0 0
B. DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM''
Congress enacted the Defense Environmental Restora-
tion Program (DERP) in 1986 to enable the Secretary of
Defense to carry out all response actions for releases of
hazardous substances at sites owned or under the jurisdic-
tion of the Department of Defense. 0 2 All activities of
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for trans-
port for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or
possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility
or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity
and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels
or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of
a hazardous substance.
Id.
97 Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989).
98 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).
Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B).
too Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C)-(D).
10 10 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988, Supp. 11 1990 & Supp. III 1991).
102 Id. § 27 01(c). The program's stated goals include:
(1) The identification, investigation, research and development,
and cleanup of contamination from hazardous substances, pollu-
tants, and contaminants.
(2) Correction of other environmental damage (such as detection
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DERP must comply with CERCLA provisions concerning
federal facilities. 10 3 The program allows DERP to obtain
response services from other federal agencies, 10 4 use
funds appropriated to the DOD for certain response ac-
tions, 105 and issue surety bonds for response action
contracts. 106
Notably, DERP policy fails to facilitate the rapid sale of
former military sites that is essential to the success of the
base closure program. The military is working to close
bases as rapidly as possible so that sites can be
redeveloped and sold as a source of revenue. 0 7 DERP,
on the other hand, has a "worst first" policy, much like
that of the EPA Superfund, which calls for the most severe
environmental problems to be tackled first.'0 8 These two
approaches are in direct conflict. Under the DERP
scheme, moderately contaminated sites that could be re-
stored rapidly must wait until the nation's most severely
contaminated federal facilities are cleaned up.'0 9 Accord-
ing to DERP, over 8,000 domestic military sites will re-
quire environmental cleanup. 110
IV. SOLUTIONS TO LOCAL LIABILITY
The fear of inheriting environmental liability is impair-
ing the ability of communities to recruit developers for
and disposal of unexploded ordnance) which creates an imminent
and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or to
the environment.
(3) Demolition and removal of unsafe buildings and structures, in-
cluding buildings and structures of the Department of Defense at
sites formerly used by or under the jurisdiction of the Secretary.
Id. § 2701(b).
103 Id. § 2701(a)(2); see infra notes 129-51 and accompanying text for discussion
of CERCLA § 120.
- 10 U.S.C. § 2701(d).
105 Id. § 2701(f).
- Id. § 2701(h)-(i).
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former base sites, "' and thereby foiling efforts by the fed-
eral government to expedite revenue-generating sales of
military land. Several approaches have emerged that can,
under the right circumstances, protect subsequent owners
of military property from CERCLA liability and thus facili-
tate transfer of former base property. Compelling the
United States government to assume liability for the envi-
ronmental hazards that its military operations created is
sometimes more difficult than one might think. It is not,
however, an impossible task. For example, in FMC Corp.
v. United States 11 the district court held the federal gov-
ernment liable as an owner-operator for environmental
response costs under CERCLA. t" 3
In FMC Corp. the plaintiff, FMC, sought a declaratory
judgment and indemnification from the United States for
contamination at a rayon manufacturing plant that FMC
owned from 1963 to 1976. FMC had purchased the plant
from American Viscose. During World War II the federal
government, through the War Productions Board (WPB),
took control of the American Viscose rayon plant. The
WPB compelled American Viscose to convert the plant to
the production of high tenacity rayon that was desperately
needed in the manufacture of tires for the war effort.
Prior to the war, the plant manufactured textile rayon.
The WPB eventually required the facility to produce one-
third of the nation's high tenacity rayon yarn. No ma-
chines at the plant were equipped to manufacture this
product prior to the entry of the WPB.
The WPB maintained significant control over all aspects
of the plant's operation including raw materials supply,
labor management, product pricing, plant expansion, and
development of product specifications. The government
also owned a large portion of the equipment installed to
convert the plant to production of the new product.
I Letter from George E. Brown, Jr. et al., (members of Congress), to Les As-
pin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee 1 (Sept. 17, 1992).
12 786 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
113 Id. at 486-87.
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During this period of government involvement, the op-
eration produced a large amount of hazardous waste. Sul-
furic acid, carbon bisulfide, and zinc contaminated waste
were buried in unlined pits at the site. During the 1980s,
carbon disulfide and arsenic were identified in the ground
water near the site. The EPA placed the site on the Na-
tional Priorities List (NPL) in 1986. The EPA notified the
Department of Commerce that in light of WPB activities
during World War II, the Department, as WPB's succes-
sor, was considered a PRP under CERCLA. The Depart-
ment of Commerce denied being an operator of the
facility and refused to participate in negotiations.
The court found that "[t]he government knew or
should have known that the disposal or treatment of haz-
ardous substances was inherent in the manufacture of
high tenacity rayon yarn and that its production require-
ments caused a significant increase in the amount of haz-
ardous substances generated and disposed of at the
facility. 1 14 The court held that as a result of its activities
at the plant, the federal government was an owner and
operator as defined in CERCLA." 5 The court found that
there was a disposal of hazardous waste at the site during
the time that the government was an owner of the facility
and that there had been a release or threatened release
that caused necessary response costs to be incurred." 6
The court subjected the government to strict, joint and
several liability under CERCLA." 7 The FMC Corp. deci-
sion demonstrates that subsequent purchasers of land
may obtain indemnification through the courts for envi-
ronmental damage caused by federal government activity.
The prospect of protracted litigation, however, discour-
ages potential purchasers from acquiring possible hazard
sites. There are several defenses available to subsequent
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takers of land contaminated by government operations.
These defenses are examined in the following sections.
A. STATUTORY DEFENSES
CERCLA provides only four enumerated defenses to li-
ability for environmental contamination."" In order to
defend against liability, a PRP must establish by a prepon-
derance that the release of hazardous substances was
caused by an act of God, an act of war, an unforeseeable
act of a third party, or a combination of any of these
causes.' 9 CERCLA liability is not subject to common law
defenses such as lack of causation. 20 Only a minority of
courts recognize equitable defenses, such as waiver and
release.' 2' CERCLA does expressly provide, however,
that liability may be avoided with proof that the release in
question is authorized' 22 by a valid federal permit. 23
- 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
119 Id.
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a
person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous sub-
stance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by -
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in
connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indi-
rectly, with the defendant (except where the sole contractual ar-
rangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage
by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with re-
spect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into
consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in
light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precau-
tions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party
and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or
omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
Id.
'd Weber, supra note 60, at 1476.
121 Id.
12 42 U.S.C. § 9607(j).
12. Id. § 9601(10).
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1. Innocent Landowner Defense
The first two defenses enumerated in CERCLA, act of
God and act of war, have seldom been successfully as-
serted by PRPs. 24 Arguably, only the innocent land-
owner defense has potential application to the purchase
of former military base property. To assert the innocent
landowner defense, a defendant must prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that 1) the hazardous contamina-
tion was caused solely by another party or parties; 2) the
defendant and the responsible parties did not have a con-
tractual relationship; 3) the defendant did not know and
did not have reason to know about the contamination at
the time of purchase; and 4) the defendant exercised due
care with respect to the site.' 25
The innocent landowner defense protects truly inno-
cent purchasers of land who make reasonable efforts to
discover hidden environmental hazards.' 2 6 To assert this
defense, a purchaser must affirmatively demonstrate that
it investigated previous ownership and use of the property
"consistent with good commercial or customary practice
in an effort to minimize liability."'' 27 Purchasers of closed
military installations, however, will have difficulty invok-
ing this defense because in almost all circumstances they
will know or could reasonably discover that a former mili-
tary installation is the site for environmental contamina-
tion. 28  Therefore, it is unlikely that this defense will be
124 Theodore L. Garrett, Superfund Liability and Defenses: A 1992 Primer, 6 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 3, 6 (1992); see United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp.
1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (finding that heavy rainfall was not an act of God
because it was foreseeable).
125 CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 581 (W.D. Mich.
1991) (holding that defendants failed to successfully assert the innocent land-
owner defense because they had an indirect contractual relationship with the con-
taminating party and the defendants had knowledge of the contamination).
126 Weber, supra note 60, at 1478.
127 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B).
1211 See Rosenberg, supra note 87, at 64 (recognizing that the "no reason to
know" requirement of the innocent landowner defense has prevented many land-
owners, insurers, and lenders from successfully asserting the defense).
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used successfully by cities or private entities that purchase
base land.
2. CERCLA Section 120129
Section 120 of CERCLA governs situations involving
environmental hazard sites owned or operated by the
United States.1 30  Prior to 1986, CERCLA lacked provi-
sions that specifically addressed federal facilities. Section
120 was added in 1986 as part of the SARA amendments
to address these sites.13' The amendment makes CER-
CLA applicable to any federal government enterprise to
the same extent that it applies to private entities. 3 2 Sec-
tion 120 also establishes a comprehensive program for
identification and cleanup of hazardous substances at fed-
eral sites. 33 The administrative framework of section 120
is somewhat unique. Rather than compelling the EPA to
take control of cleanup operations at federal sites, that re-
sponsibility is left in the hands of the government agency
that operates the facility. 134
- 42 U.S.C. § 9620.
1s0 Id. § 9620(a)-(j). Section 120 provides:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States
• . . shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the same
manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively,
as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section
9607 of this title. ...
All guidelines, rules, regulations, and criteria which are applicable
to preliminary assessments carried out under this chapter for facili-
ties at which hazardous substances are located, applicable to evalua-
tions of such facilities under the National Contingency Plan,
applicable to inclusion on the National Priorities List, or applicable
to remedial actions at such facilities shall also be applicable to facili-
ties which are owned or operated by a department, agency, or instru-
mentality of the United States in the same manner and to the extent
as such guidelines, rules, regulations, and criteria are applicable to
other facilities.
Id. § 9620(a)(1)-(2).
'3' Gaydosh, supra note 73, at 21.
132 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (1988); Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 938 F.2d 276, 279
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
13 42 U.S.C. § 9620(b)-(j).
134 Gaydosh, supra note 73, at 22.
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This policy arises from an executive order'35 that dele-
gates CERCLA authority to executive agencies. 3 6 Ordi-
narily, the EPA has authority to undertake response and
enforcement actions when a hazardous release occurs.
When that release involves a federal facility, however, au-
thority to take responsive action is delegated to the execu-
tive agency with jurisdiction over that facility.' 37 This
system leads to the anomaly of giving an executive agency
that is a PRP at a hazardous site the authority for taking
response and enforcement action. 3 8 The EPA has au-
thority to undertake removal action at a federal facility
only in an emergency.13 9
Section 120, however, imposes several requirements
that seek to prevent an agency from abusing this power.
First, no agency or department of the federal government
is permitted to adopt rules inconsistent with those of the
EPA.' 40 Thus, although an agency is free to administer its
own cleanup operations, it must do so in accordance with
established EPA policies and procedures. 14 t Additionally,
section 120 establishes the Federal Agency Hazardous
Waste Compliance Docket for tracking and publication of
all information concerning hazardous waste sites at fed-
eral facilities. 4 2 Pursuant to section 120, a list of all fed-
eral facilities included on the docket is published every six
months in the Federal Register; additional information on
those sites is available through the EPA.' 43 Section 120
"35 Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987).
136 Id. This order also establishes a National Response Team (NRT) which in-
cludes "representatives of appropriate Federal departments and agencies for na-
tional planning and coordination of preparedness and response actions, and
regional response teams as the regional counterpart to the NRT for planning and
coordination of regional preparedness and response actions." Id. § 1.
17 Gaydosh, supra note 73, at 22.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(2).
141 Id. Responsible federal agencies are prohibited from "adopt[ing] or
utiliz[ing] any such guidelines, rules, regulations, or criteria which are inconsis-
tent with the guidelines, rules, and criteria established by the" EPA. Id.
142 Id. § 9620(c).
14 Id.
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also mandates specific requirements and deadlines for as-
sessment, evaluation, remedial investigations, feasibility
studies, and remedial action at federal facilities. 44
Section 120 further imposes EPA control on govern-
ment sites by requiring all responsible federal agencies to
enter into an Interagency Agreement (IAG) with the
EPA.' 45 IAGs give the EPA authority to review and select
which remedial measures the agency will implement.' 46
Like private decrees, IAGs require the EPA to review and
approve all response actions. 47 IAGs, however, call for
dispute resolution by the EPA administrator and limit the
payment of penalties to available appropriated funds. 148
The agreements also contain language that subjects re-
sponse action to the integrated obligations of both CER-
CLA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA).' 49 While CERCLA does not provide for devel-
opment of a state program, RCRA involves state enforce-
ment of corrective action, which is similar to CERCLA
cleanup. 50 This overlap creates friction between states
and the federal government concerning cleanup opera-
tions at federal facilities.' 5 '
a. Waiver of Immunity
Section 120(a)(1) has been held to constitute a specific
waiver of the sovereign immunity of the federal govern-
ment in those circumstances in which it would otherwise
14 Id. § 9620(d)-(e).
145 Id. § 9620(e)(2).
146 Id.
147 Gaydosh, supra note 73, at 22.
14A Id.
,49 Id. RCRA prescribes standards for handling hazardous wastes, but it does
not have the broad scope of CERCLA. Essentially, CERCLA targets sites on
which environmental contamination is already present, while RCRA focuses on
avoiding future contamination. Turkula, supra note 59, at 169.
1-10 Gaydosh, supra note 73, at 22.
'.' Id. at 23. The EPA generally defers placement of a site on the NPL when
RCRA corrective action is adequate. The federal government, however, has not
applied this policy to federal hazard sites, claiming that state RCRA programs do
not apply to federal sites on the NPL. Id.
[59
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be liable under CERCLA as a private entity. 52  This
waiver of immunity only applies to situations in which the
United States is acting outside its regulatory capacity.' 5 3
When the EPA is engaged in environmental cleanup, the
sovereign immunity of the federal government is intact. 154
Section 120 amends section 107(g) to include a specific,
limited waiver of immunity when the government acts as a
private entity. 155
In addition to Congress and the courts, the executive
branch has also expressed intent for the federal govern-
ment to be subject to the same standards of environmen-
tal liability as would a private entity under like
circumstances. During a 1988 campaign speech, then
Vice President George Bush said, "I will insist that in the
future Federal agencies meet or exceed environmental
standards and that the government should live within the
laws it imposes on others."'' 56 In its statutorily mandated
report, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Com-
mission acknowledged that the DOD was obligated to
clean up environmentally contaminated sites at military
bases. 5 7 The commission promised that "[w]ithin the ca-
pabilities of technology and the availability of funds, DOD
is committed to restoring closing bases to safe condi-
152 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 10 (1989); United States v. Az-
rael, 765 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Md. 1991). In Union Gas, the Supreme Court said in
dicta that the language of § 9620(a)(1) was "doubtless an 'unequivocal expres-
sion' of the Federal Government's waiver of its own sovereign immunity." Union
Gas, 491 U.S. at 10.
153 Azrael, 765 F. Supp. at 1246. The waiver of immunity under section 120
does not apply to situations in which the federal government "is acting in a regu-
latory capacity pursuant to CERCLA's cleanup provisions." Id. at 1244.
1- Id. at 1246.
15 United States v. Skipper, 781 F. Supp. 1106, 1111 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
"There is no question that Congress expected government agencies
to shoulder their proportionate share of CERCLA response costs
when they have acted as owners, operators, generators or transport-
ers .... Under CERCLA, the United States is to contribute its share
when it acts in a fashion analogous to that of a business concern."
Id.
1 Environmental Compliance by Federal Agencies: Hearings on H.R. 1056 Before the
Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1989) (quoting Vice President George Bush).
151 H.R. Doc. No. 111, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 74-75 (1991).
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tion." 58 The Department of Defense Base Closure Ac-
count 1990 can be used to fund this environmental
restoration. 59
At least two courts have addressed the government's
limited waiver of immunity and held that under circum-
stances in which the government is acting as a private
party, it should be held liable as one. In Key Tronic Corp. v.
United States 160 a private corporation sought contribution
from the federal government for prejudgment interest, at-
torney's fees, and other costs incurred in establishing that
the government was partially responsible as a generator
for the contamination of a county landfill. The Air Force
disposed of liquid chemicals at the Colbert landfill in Spo-
kane County, Washington from 1975 to 1980. Key Tronic
also disposed of similar materials at the site. In 1980,
nearby drinking water wells were found to be contami-
nated with toxic chemicals. Key Tronic paid over $1.2
million in cleanup costs. Later, Key Tronic entered into a
consent decree with the EPA and Washington Depart-
ment of Ecology whereby the company would pay an addi-
tional $4.2 million in response costs. The Air Force
entered a similar consent decree in which it agreed to pay
$1.4 million for its share of cleanup at Colbert.
Key Tronic sued the government for contribution to
both the $4.2 million and the $1.2 million amounts it had
paid for cleanup. The trial court dismissed Key Tronic's
claims against the Air Force for contribution to the $4.2
million settlement payment.' 6' The court, however,
granted partial summary judgment to Key Tronic for con-
tribution to the $1.2 million settlement that the company
had incurred separately. 62 The court held the Air Force
liable under CERCLA to Key Tronic. 63 The Air Force
subsequently settled all of Key Tronic's claims except for
'p" Id. at 74.
, Id.
'o 766 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
161 Id. at 868.
162 Id.
163 Id.
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attorney's and investigator's fees and prejudgment inter-
est amounts that the company incurred while it searched
for other PRPs and pursued the recovery action. 64
The government contended that a general waiver of
sovereign immunity, like that in section 120 of CERCLA,
was insufficient to subject the United States to an award of
prejudgment interest. The government asserted that an
express congressional consent to an interest award was
required in addition to a general waiver of immunity. The
court distinguished this situation from the previous im-
munity case cited by the government. 65 The court held
that section 120 made it clear that Congress intended to
waive sovereign immunity and to treat the government as
it would any other private entity. 66 The court further
found that section 120 allows the plaintiff in a cost recov-
ery action to recover prejudgment interest. 67  Thus, the
court held "that CERCLA allows prejudgment interest as
an element of damages against the United States."'' 68
In United States v. Moore ' 69 the district court held that the
I64 Id. at 867. CERCLA does not specifically provide for recovery of a plaintiff's
attorney's fees. Id. at 869. Key Tronic, however, asserted that it was entitled to
attorney's fees as enforcement costs that are recoverable as a necessary response
cost. The court found that "absent specific Congressional intent to the contrary,
CERCLA should be interpreted liberally to permit recovery associated with identi-
fying potentially responsible parties and forcing those responsible parties to share
their fair portion of the cleanup of a hazardous waste site." Id. at 871.
The court went on to find that a private party may incur enforcement costs and
recover its attorney's fees for pursuing a cost recovery action under CERCLA. Id.
The court said that if it "narrowly read the statute as the Government suggests,
then even innocent purchasers of property who clean up hazardous wastes and
subsequently seek recovery from the responsible parties would be unable to re-
cover the entirety of the expenses incurred in holding the responsible parties ac-
countable for their pollution." Id. at 872. The court also read CERCLA language
broadly so as to allow Key Tronic to recover costs it incurred in searching for
PRPs and negotiating consent decrees. Id.
161 Id. The government relied on Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310
(1986), for its contention. The court, however, found the government's argument
unpersuasive because the statute in Shaw provided that the United States shall be
liable for costs as a private individual, but did not make reference to prejudgment
interest. Key Tronic, 766 F. Supp. at 868.
1 Key Tronic, 766 F. Supp. at 868.
167 Id. at 868-69.
Ic" ld. at 868.
166 703 F. Supp. 455 (E.D. Va. 1988).
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government is subject to a contribution action in the same
manner as a private party. 70 The DOD allegedly sold cyl-
inders containing a hazardous substance to Moore. The
United States brought a CERCIA action against Moore
for recovery of response costs for environmental damage
caused by the cylinders. Moore then brought four coun-
terclaims. Count I alleged common law tort and a Fifth
Amendment taking, involving $75,000 worth of fire extin-
guishers removed during cleanup operations. Count II
claimed breach of contract, breach of warranties, and vio-
lation of environmental laws surrounding the sale of the
cylinders. Counts III and IV, respectively, asked for in-
demnity and contribution against the DOD.
The court agreed with the government that the two year
statute of limitations in the Federal Tort Claims Act
barred the tort claim,171 and that the Tucker Act 172 pre-
cluded the court's jurisdiction over the constitutional and
contractual claims in excess of$10,000.173 The court also
held that it lacked jurisdiction under the Contract Dis-
putes Act,' 74 over contracts entered into on or after
March 1, 1979.175
The court, however, allowed the counterclaims under
the doctrine of recoupment. 76 The court stated that "by
initiating this suit, the United States has consented to the
assertion of counterclaims under the doctrine of recoup-
ment." 77 According to the court, the counterclaim in-
volving removal of the fire extinguishers met the test for
recoupment since the alleged taking took place at the
same time as the cleanup operations that were the basis of
170 Id. at 459.
, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1988).
172 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988).
173 Moore, 703 F. Supp. at 458.
17- 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (1988).
175 Moore, 703 F. Supp. at 458.
176 Id. The court said that in order to sustain a counterclaim under the doctrine
of recoupment, the counterclaim must "aris[e] out of the same transaction or oc-
currence which is the subject of the government's suit and [seek] relief only to the
extent of diminishing or defeating the government's recovery." Id.
177 Id.
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the government's suit. 7 8 The court also found that
although the contract, warranty, and environmental
claims surrounding the sale of the hazardous cylinders
qualified as claims for recoupment, they were effectively
merged into the counterclaims for indemnity and contri-
bution because the recoupment doctrine did not allow for
affirmative recovery from the United States. 79
Finally, the court held that Moore's counterclaims for
indemnity and contribution were predicated upon CER-
CLA, which provided for federal rights of indemnity and
contribution. °8 0 The court found that since CERCLA
"provides that the United States shall be subject to suit 'in
the same manner and to the same extent, both procedur-
ally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity,' "
the DOD was subject to contribution in the same manner
as a private party.' 8 ' The DOD argued that it was not sub-
ject to a contribution action pursuant to CERCLA a2 be-
cause it had already settled with the EPA. The court
disagreed, finding that the EPA-DOD settlement was not
an administrative settlement under section 9613.183 Once
again, the court imposed CERCIA liability on a federal
government agency in the same manner as a private
entity.
In the context of former military installations, the gov-
ernment is acting as an operator, and not as a regulator.
When the government sells base land, it is acting as a pri-
vate seller just as it was when the DOD sold the hazardous
cylinders to Moore.8 4 Therefore, the courts should ulti-
mately treat the DOD as a private party in accordance with
178 Id. at 459,
179 Id.
180 Id.
8 Id. at 459 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)).
182 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f(2) (1988).
I'l Moore, 703 F. Supp. at 459. The court cited the fact that no administrative
procedures had been followed in the agreement and no impartial arbiter ap-
proved the settlement. Id. Additionally, the court stated that a settlement be-
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section 120 and impose environmental liability on it for
the contamination of former military sites.
b. Notice Requirement
Section 120 establishes a scheme for the identification
and cleanup of environmental contamination at federal fa-
cilities. Section 120 imposes notice and covenant require-
ments when the federal government transfers
contaminated real property. 85 The notice requirement of
section 120 states:
[W]henever any department, agency, or instrumentality of
the United States enters into any contract for the sale or
other transfer of real property which is owned by the
United States and on which any hazardous substance was
stored for one year or more, known to have been released,
or disposed of, the head of such department, agency, or
instrumentality shall include in such contract notice of the
type and quantity of such hazardous substance and notice
of the time at which such storage, release, or disposal took
place, to the extent such information is available on the
basis of a complete search of agency files. 186
Section 120(h)(1), therefore, requires any contract for the
transfer of base property to include notification of any en-
vironmental hazards at the sites of which the government
had knowledge.' 8 7 The statute further compels similar
notice to be included in subsequent deeds transferring
federal real property.' 88
In 1990, the EPA promulgated a rule under this section
that would have limited the notice requirement to only
environmental contamination that took place "during the
time the property was owned by the United States.' 8119
The D.C. Circuit addressed this rule in Hercules Inc. v.
EPA.' 90 Petitioners, who periodically contracted for the
185 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h) (1988).
186 id. § 9620(h)(1).
187 Id.
." Id. § 9620(h)(3).
,mg 40 C.F.R. § 373.1 (1992).
190 938 F.2d 276 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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purchase of federal property, complained that the EPA
rule was "contrary to the express terms of the statute,
congressional intent, and the statutory scheme taken as a
whole."' 9' The EPA explained that it believed that sec-
tion 120(h) was not meant to reach activities that occurred
prior to government ownership because Congress was
concerned with those federal facilities that dealt directly
with the storage, release, or disposal of hazardous materi-
als. The court rejected the EPA rule as a contradiction of
the plain meaning of section 120,192 and held that the no-
tice requirement extended to cover government property
contaminated by prior owners. 193
The court recognized that such a construction could
also reach the deed covenant requirements under section
120(h)(3).' 94 However, the court refused to allow such
considerations to influence its decision and responded
that "[i]f our construction of the statute imposes financial
burdens on federal agencies beyond those that flow from
other provisions of CERCLA, relief from those burdens
must come from Congress."' 95 Under the current notice
requirement of section 120, a federal agency must provide
to purchasers of government land notice of all hazardous
substance activity of which the agency is aware, 9 6 but the
notice requirement is limited to that information con-
tained in agency files. 197 Thus, the military should be re-
quired to notify subsequent base land purchasers of any
known activity involving hazardous substances, regardless
of when it occurred. 98
c. Deed Covenants
Section 120(b)(3) may offer cities and private purchas-
19, Id. at 280.
192 Id.
193 Id.




', See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(1) (1988).
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ers protection against environmental liability for base
sites. This section places requirements on deeds transfer-
ring property containing environmental contamination as
follows:
[I]n the case of any real property owned by the United
States on which any hazardous substance was stored for
one year or more, known to have been released, or dis-
posed of, each deed entered into for the transfer of such
property by the United States to any other person or en-
tity shall contain-
(A) to the extent such information is available on the ba-
sis of a complete search of agency files-
(i) a notice of the type and quantity of such hazardous
substances,
(ii) notice of the time at which such storage, release, or
disposal took place, and
(iii) a description of the remedial action taken, if any,
and
(B) a covenant warranting that-
(i) all remedial action necessary to protect human
health and the environment with respect to any such sub-
stance remaining on the property has been taken before
the date of such transfer, and
(ii) any additional remedial action found to be neces-
sary after the date of such transfer shall be conducted by
the United States.' 99
Thus, under this provision, the federal government
must warrant environmental cleanup at federal facilities
transferred to other parties.2 0 0 This express provision
should assure subsequent purchasers of domestic military
installations that they will not be subject to liability for
environmental hazards left behind by the military. As
mentioned before, this covenant requirement will proba-
bly extend to all hazardous substance activity at the site
known to the federal agency, regardless of who initiated
the activity.20 At a minimum, if purchasers of govern-
-o Id. § 9620(h)(3).
200 Id.
2-1 See Hercules, 938 F.2d at 281 (indicating a construction of section 120(h)(3)
CERCLA LIABILITY
ment land are required to pay for cleanup, they should be
able to maintain an action on such covenants against the
deep pockets of the federal government. The promise of
ultimate indemnification offered by a deed covenant, how-
ever, may not be enough to convince developers to risk
incurring initial response costs and the cost of litigation.
Nor will it expedite the cleanup of known hazard sites so
that they may be sold and redeveloped.
B. INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENTS
Purchasers of base land may also pursue contractual in-
demnification through private agreements between the
parties to the sale. On its face, CERCLA appears to
render agreements to indemnify PRPs from CERCLA lia-
bility unenforceable. °2 Section 107(e) provides that
[n]o indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement
or conveyance shall be effective to transfer from the owner
or operator of any vessel or facility or from any person
who may be liable for a release or threat of release under
this section, to any other person the liability imposed
under this section.203
The very next sentence of the section, however, states
conversely that "[n]othing in this subsection shall bar any
agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party
to such agreement for any liability under this section. 20 4
The courts have resolved this apparent contradiction to
prevent such agreements from absolving parties of liabil-
ity to the government, while enforcing indemnification
agreements as between the parties to the agreement.20 5
Thus, private parties to a land transaction are free to
transfer CERCLA liability by contract even though both
are vulnerable as PRPs to enforcement action by the EPA
which would apply to hazardous substance activity conducted by prior owners of
government land).
202 Weber, supra note 60, at 1493.
203 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988).
2G4 Id.
.o Puralator Prods. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124, 129
(W.D.N.Y. 1991).
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under CERCLA. °6 Contractual indemnification does not
limit the liability of a PRP to the federal government
under CERCLA.2 °7 Such agreements can nevertheless
provide a PRP with a means for recovering response costs
paid under CERCLA.2 ° a Since the federal government is
a party to land transactions involving former military in-
stallations and, as such, is subject to the same liability as a
private party,2 °9 indemnification agreements with the
DOD may provide additional protection for purchasers.
Contractual indemnification, when available, offers a
PRP several advantages over subsequent actions for con-
tribution. First, successful contractual indemnification is
efficient. The PRP may obtain full recovery from one
party in a single action, rather than engaging in lengthy
and expensive searches for PRPs that may be liable for
contribution. 2 0  Additionally, the indemnifying party
does not have to qualify as a PRP. 21 ' Even a party that
successfully asserts the innocent landowner defense to lia-
bility to the government may be held contractually liable
under a valid agreement.21 2 Finally, a party is not pro-
tected from contractual liability by settling with the gov-
ernment. Indemnification actions are valid against both
settling and nonsettling parties.213
Courts are split as to whether contractual indemnifica-
tion from CERCLA liability must be express.21 4 The de-
termination of whether an agreement effectively shifts
CERCLA liability between parties is a matter of contract
206 Weber, supra note 60, at 1493.
207 Id.
208 Id.
2 0 See supra notes 152-84 and accompanying text.




224 Compare Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., 669
F. Supp. 1285, 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (requiring unequivocal language in CERCLA
indemnity agreement) with Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454,
1456 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a general discharge of claims was valid to re-
lease seller from CERCLA liability).
[59
CERCLA LIABILITY
interpretation under state law.215 Courts examine the lan-
guage of indemnity agreements to determine if the parties
intended to transfer CERCLA liability. 6 Generally, an
"as is" warranty disclaimer, like those included in typical
purchase agreements, will not transfer CERCLA liability
from the seller to the buyer.1 7 Courts tend to narrowly
interpret language designed to limit the exposure of an
indemnifying party and thereby favor enforcement of in-
demnity agreements.21 8
C. CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTIONS
In section 120, the government promises to eventually
clean up its environmental mess. But with liability stakes
as high as those in CERCLA, prospective purchasers are
still justifiably reluctant to put themselves at risk without
more assurances. This concern, along with the pressing
need to expedite base land cleanup, has recently
prompted Congress to direct legislation at overcoming
the threat of CERCLA liability and facilitating transfer of
base land to municipal and private developers.
1. Appropriations Bills
The Senate version of the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for fiscal year 1993 (the Authorization Act) 21 9 in-
cluded several provisions designed to facilitate the
cleanup and transfer of former military installations. 2
The House passed a version of the Authorization Act 2 2 '
that did not address these issues. The Senate insisted on
its amendments and refused to pass the House bill. 22 Af-
215 Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1457-60.
216 Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1000-01 (D.N.J.
1988).
217 Weber, supra note 60, at 1496.
218 Id.
219 S. 3114, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
220 Id. §§ 314-17.
221 H.R. 5006, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
222 138 CONG. REC. S14,195 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Nunn).
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ter a conference was held, both houses agreed to the
amended version of H.R. 5006, and it was signed into law
by President Bush on October 24, 1992.23
a. Indemnification
The Senate version of the Authorization Act included a
provision to enable local governments, private develop-
ers, and contractors to secure indemnification from the
federal government for environmental liability arising
from DOD activity at military bases.22 4 Section 317 pro-
vided that the Secretary of the Air Force indemnify and
hold harmless the recipients of real property at military
installations for releases of hazardous substances result-
ing from military activities at the base prior to closure.2 5
Opponents in the House said this bill provided insuffi-
cient protection for future owners because any indemnifi-
cation under this section was subject to the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA). 2 6 The FTCA227 states that the
United States cannot be held liable for injuries resulting
from decisions made in pursuit of the national interest,
even if the government acted negligently. 228  Since the
221 Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2315 (1992).
224 S. 3114, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 317 (1992).
225 Id.
[T]he Secretary of Defense shall hold harmless, defend, and indem-
nify in full the persons and entities described ... from and against
all suits, claims, demands or actions, liabilities, judgments, and costs
and other fees arising out of, or in any manner predicated upon, the
release or threatened release of any hazardous substance or pollu-
tant or contaminant as a result of Department of Defense activities at
any military installation (or portion thereof) that is closed pursuant
to a base closure law.
Id. § 317(a)(1).
226 Id. § 317(b)(2). "No indemnification may be afforded under this provision
which is not subject to and consistent with chapter 171 of title 28, United States
Code, including any procedural requirements or defense." Id.; see Brown, supra
note 111, at 2 (advocating the elimination of any reference to the FTCA from
section 317).
227 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988).
228 Id. No liability exists under the FTCA for "any claim . . . based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary func-
tion or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused." Id.
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military activity that led to environmental contamination
of the bases would likely be protected under the FTCA,
several members of Congress pointed out that such a limi-
tation would ensure that local communities and busi-
nesses would not be indemnified. 29
Representative Richard Ray proposed H.R. 4025, which
would have modified section 317 to eliminate any refer-
ence to the FTCA and more fully indemnify subsequent
purchasers of closed bases. 23 0 The final version of the Au-
thorization Act, as returned by the Conference Commit-
tee, included a provision like section 317 of the Senate
bill.23' The Conference Committee, however, omitted
any reference to the FTCA. 32 Therefore, indemnification
under the Authorization Act as signed by the President is
not limited by the FTCA.233
Additionally, the conference version of the Authoriza-
tion Act includes language similar to that in the original
Senate version that prohibits indemnification of persons
or entities to the extent that they contributed to any con-
tamination. 34 This language limits indemnification to
only that liability that purchasers incur by innocently tak-
ing title to land contaminated by government operations,
and does not offer parties a means for avoiding liability
for their own environmental contamination.235 The Au-
thorization Act, as amended in conference, indemnifies
any state, political subdivision (including officers, agents
and employees), or "[a]ny other person or entity that ac-
quires such ownership or control" of former base prop-
229 Brown, supra note 11, at 2 (declaring that language in section 317 that
made indemnification subject to the FTCA would indemnify "the federal govern-
ment in virtually all cases of environmental contamination" because military ac-
tion would probably be protected).
230 H.R. 4025, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); see Brown, supra note 111, at 2 (ad-
vocating passage of H.R. 4025).
231 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 966, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
232 Id. at 60-62.
233 Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 330, 106 Stat. 2371 (1992).
2-4 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 966, at 60.
235 See Brown, supra note 11, at 2 (stating that similar language in H.R. 4025
"appropriately" avoided indemnifying reusers of base land for their own environ-
mental damage).
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erty, or "[a]ny successor, assignee, transferee, lender, or
lessee of any person or entity. '23 6
b. Environmental Pilot Program
The Authorization Act also includes a provision that
lays the groundwork for later environmental restoration
by establishing a pilot program designed to expedite envi-
ronmental restoration at selected bases affected by base
closure laws.23 7 As part of the program, the Secretary of
Defense must select bases that represent "a variety of the
environmental restoration activities required for facilities
under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program
and for military installations scheduled for closure under"
base closure laws. 23 8 The chosen sites must also repre-
sent environmental restoration projects of various magni-
tudes in order to facilitate participation by a full range of
business sizes in restoration contracts.2 3
The Secretary of Defense is authorized to use the pilot
sites to develop an accelerated, streamlined program for
environmental restoration, which incorporates "develop-
ment and use of innovative contracting techniques," in
order to expedite restoration activities. 24 ° The Secretary
of Defense is to carry out program activities in accordance
with federal and state laws, while utilizing competitive
procedures and considering experience and ability in se-
lecting contractors for restoration projects.2 4 ' Represen-
tative Richard Ray initiated this program in an
amendment to the original H.R. 5006.242
236 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 966, at 60.
237 Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 323, 106 Stac. 2365 (1992).
238 Id. § 323(b)(3)(A).
239 Id. § 323(b)(3)(B).
240 Id. § 323(c)(1).
24. Id. § 323(d)(1)-(3).
242 H.R. REP. No. 545, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 68-69 (1992).
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2. Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act 243
The Community Environmental Response Facilitation
Act (CERFA) represents an attempt to combat environ-
mental liability problems by severing usable land from en-
vironmentally contaminated areas and transferring to
subsequent purchasers only the portions free from con-
tamination, thereby facilitating redevelopment of the base
sites.244 CERFA, which originated in the House,24 5 re-
sponds to the adverse effect of base closures on the econ-
omies of local communities and the impairment of
transfer and redevelopment projects that have been cre-
ated by environmental contamination.246
CERFA amends CERCLA to require the federal gov-
241 Pub. L. No. 102-426, 106 Stat. 2174 (1992) (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 9620(h)).
244 Id.
245 H.R. 4016, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
246 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 986, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Congress found
that:
(1) The closure of certain Federal facilities is having adverse effects
on the economies of local communities by eliminating jobs associ-
ated with such facilities, and delay in remediation of environmental
contamination of real property at such facilities is preventing trans-
fer and private development of such property.
(2) Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the United
States, in cooperation with local communities, should expeditiously
identify real property that offers the greatest opportunity for reuse
and redevelopment on each facility under the jurisdiction of the de-
partment, agency, or instrumentality where operations are
terminating.
(3) Remedial actions, including remedial investigations and feasi-
bility studies, and corrective actions at such Federal facilities should
be expedited in a manner to facilitate environmental protection and
the sale or transfer of such excess real property for the purpose of
mitigating adverse economic effects on the surrounding community.
(4) Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the United
States, in accordance with applicable law, should make available
without delay such excess real property.
(5) In the case of any real property owned by the United States and
transferred to another person, the United States Government
should remain responsible for conducting any remedial action or
corrective action necessary to protect human health and the environ-
ment with respect to any hazardous substance or petroleum product
or its derivatives, including aviation fuel and motor oil, that was
present on such real property at the time of transfer.
Id. at 1-2.
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ernment to identify land that is part of facilities that the
federal government plans to close under a base closure
law at which no hazardous substances or petroleum prod-
ucts have been stored, disposed of, or released. 47 Once
the head of the federal department or agency with juris-
diction over the site identifies uncontaminated real prop-
erty at a site listed on the NPL, he must obtain
concurrence in the identification from the Administrator
of the EPA.248 Appropriate state officials must concur in
the identification of contaminated property not included
on the NPL.249 Requiring EPA concurrence in the identi-
fication of uncontaminated portions of Superfund sites
serves two functions. Concurrence provides the certainty
of EPA control over the identification process and simul-
taneously facilitates an independent assessment of the
real property that potential investors will likely require.25 0
Once the identification and concurrence process is
complete, the uncontaminated land may be sold or trans-
ferred, provided that the resulting deed contains a cove-
nant warranting that any subsequent response or
corrective action will be conducted by the United States
and a clause granting the federal government access to
the site in order to conduct such action. 5' Congress de-
cided that the federal government should retain responsi-
bility for conducting any remedial or corrective action
217 Pub. L. No. 102-426, § 3, 106 Stat. 2174, 2175 (1992) (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 9620(h)). Identification of uncontaminated real property must at a minimum
consist of a detailed search of federal government records, chain of title docu-
ments, and reasonably attainable aerial photographs. Additionally, officials must
make a visual inspection of the buildings and structures on the real property in
question and adjacent land. Officials must inspect all reasonably attainable fed-
eral, state, and local government records concerning adjacent land where releases
have occurred. Finally, officials must interview current or former employees who
were involved in base operations. The identification process must also include
sampling when appropriate under the circumstances. Id.
244 Id.
249 Id.
2- 138 CONG. REC. S16,687 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Mitchell).
251 Pub. L. No. 102-426, § 3, 106 Stat. 2174, 2176 (1992) (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 9620(h)(1988)).
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necessary to protect human health and the environment
from the effects of any hazardous substance present on
the land at the time it was transferred. 2
Additionally, CERFA addresses the problem of reme-
dial measures that take decades to completely remove en-
vironmental contamination. CERCLA requires that in
order to transfer federal property on which a hazardous
substance has been stored, released, or disposed of, the
government must warrant that all necessary remedial ac-
tion has been taken. 53 CERFA amends section 120(h)(3)
of CERCLA to provide that "all remedial action ... has
been taken if the construction and installation of an ap-
proved remedial design has been completed, and the rem-
edy has been demonstrated to the Administrator to be
operating properly and successfully.12 54 The Act pre-
vents long-term treatment operations from impeding the
transfer of federal property.25 5 The amendment enables
the government to transfer real property that is subject to
long-term restoration procedures, such as ground water
pumping and treatment, once the government has estab-
lished that the treatment operation is operating
successfully. 56
It is unclear what incentives remain to compel the fed-
eral government to expedite cleanup of hazardous sites
after they have been severed from base land and transfer
of clean property has been completed.2 57 Like the indem-
nification provisions of the 1993 National Defense Au-
thorization Act, 58 CERFA attempts to alleviate the threat
of transferred CERCLA liability that has thus far stifled
redevelopment of closing bases.
252 Id.
253 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3) (1988).




257 See Schneider, supra note 7, at 3A.
2'" Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 3180 (1992).
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V. OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS OF BASE
CLOSURE AND CLEANUP
There may be a bright side to the environmental lega-
cies left behind by the military. It may be just what is
needed to boost the economic slump brought on by the
end of the cold war and the corresponding reduction in
military spendingY59 Many believe that environmental
cleanup will represent a new strategic goal for the mili-
tary. 60 Overall, cleanup efforts could take as long as 30
years and cost up to $400 billion. 26 ' This massive under-
taking could provide jobs for many of those left unem-
ployed by defense cut-backs. Additionally, the effort
could provide incentives for development of new technol-
ogy in the business of environmental cleanup. 62
Already, many military contractors are opening new en-
vironmental divisions to compete for government cleanup
contracts.26 3 Such contractors are being forced to look
for other fields in which they can apply their tremendous
technological and managerial resources.2 64 The influx of
competition and technology may transform environmen-
tal cleanup from simple removal and pump-out opera-
tions to truly innovative remedies. 65 The entry of
military contractors into the field of environmental
cleanup is not, however, without impediment. Despite
such optimistic possibilities, aerospace firms may hesitate
to risk their corporate well-being on environmental
projects since Congress is reluctant to provide liberal con-
tractor indemnification.2 66
In addition to changing the complexion of industrial
technology, base closures may provide some surrounding










communities with a new lease on life. In the past, some
communities that were injured by the closure of a local
military base have turned their misfortune into economic
success. When Kincheloe Air Force Base closed in 1970,
the surrounding community of Kincheloe, Michigan hired
an economist, obtained federal grants, and focused its ef-
forts on compensating for the loss of the base.267 The re-
sults included new businesses and nearly three times
more jobs than those lost when the base closed.268
Many communities affected by the latest round of base
closures have begun plans to redevelop base sites. 2 69 To
be successful, however, any project of this magnitude re-
quires direction and coordination. Some government of-
ficials say the effort lacks the direction it needs at this
stage.27 °
VII. CONCLUSION
We have seen that the extent of liability under CERCLA
is substantial. Taking title to base land without protection
from liability can subject a purchaser to the full cost of
environmental cleanup even though the purchaser may
have played no part in creating the contamination. This
potential for devastating liability has impaired efforts to
transfer base land to private and municipal entities and to
facilitate development of new uses for the sites.2 7'
Prompt cleanup will be the key to redevelopment of
base sites and to the corresponding revival of local econo-
mies. Representative George Brown has warned that
communities affected by base closures must be able to ac-
quire base property and convert it to civilian use in order
to survive the loss of the base.272 Brown said, "[t]he key
question is not whether the bases will be cleaned up, but
267 Rogers Worthington, For Some, Base Closings Open Door to Success, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 8, 1989, at C23.
268 Id.
21'9 See supra notes 32-51 and accompanying text.
270 Worthington, supra note 267, at C23.
211 See supra notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
272 See Dilworth, supra note 41, at 15.
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whether they will be cleaned up to the extent necessary
for their property to be sold upon closure. ' 273
We have also seen a number of ways in which purchas-
ers and other transferees may protect themselves from lia-
bility. One of these, the innocent landowner defense, is in
all likelihood a dead end in light of the knowledge that
purchasers will have about the existing environmental
conditions at the bases. Clearly, the innocent landowner
defense was created to protect only those purchasers who
had no knowledge of prior contamination of their
properties. 74
Congress, however, amended CERCLA to treat the fed-
eral government as though it were a private entity when
acting outside its regulatory capacity.275 This ultimately
provides the best protection for purchasers of contami-
nated sites. Section 120 of CERCLA waives the govern-
ment's sovereign immunity when it is acting as an owner,
operator, generator, or transporter of hazardous
wastes. 76 Section 120 also offers protection to subse-
quent landowners in the form of notice and deed cove-
nants placing liability on the government when its
activities cause the contamination. 277
Obviously the government cannot expect the private
sector to take title to land knowing it might be saddled
with the price of the government's negligence. Aware of
this apprehension, Congress continues to pass bills that
attempt to reassure potential purchasers and developers
that they will be indemnified from this enormous bur-
den.278 With the stakes so high, however, purchasers de-
mand every possible guarantee.
Just as the potential price of environmental cleanup is
monumental, the possible benefits to be gained from re-
development of military installations are also substantial.
273 Id. (quoting Rep. George Brown).
271 See supra notes 124-128 and accompanying text.
21.1 See supra notes 129-151 and accompanying text.
271; See supra notes 152-184 and accompanying text.
277 See supra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 219-258 and accompanying text.
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In an economy that has been wounded by the reduction in
military spending, local governments have given priority
to the redevelopment of base land in order to provide
new jobs for citizens. Even the environmental cleanup
operations themselves may provide opportunities to inject
new vigor into the economy by providing jobs and im-
proving technology. 2 79
Environmental cleanup at closing military bases will be
an expensive and lengthy task. It is likely that the govern-
ment will eventually pay for cleanup at the bases. If the
bases are going to be redeveloped in time to compensate
for their impact on the economy, the environmental liabil-
ity issue must be settled quickly. The private sector must
be confident that it will not be held accountable for the
government's negligence.
27,, See supra notes 259-270 and accompanying text.
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